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The strategy and thought of Mao Ze-dong, judging by the
sheer volume of writing devoted to it, appears to have been sub-
jected to the most thorough analysis by students of China. This
work has most often compared Mao with both the &dquo;orthodox&dquo;
Marxist tradition and traditional Chinese thought. Mao’s con-
ceptions have been closely compared with those of Lenin, Stalin,
and Trotsky (Schwartz, 1951; Meisner, 1967; Schram and
d’Encausse, 1969; Schram, 1971; Starr, 1971); with Gramsci,
Lukacs, Korsch, Marcuse, and a host of lesser Marxist figures
(Wakeman, 1973); with Russian Populists (Meisner, 1971); with
. the intellectual traditions of China (Meisner, 1967; Wakeman,
1973); and with Kant, Hegel, and a corps of obscure Kantian
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and neo-Hegelian philosophers (Wakeman, 1973). Mao’s
originality as a Marxist thinker has been attacked (Wittfogel,
1960), defended (Schwartz, 1960), and carefully qualified
(Schram, 1967, 1971). An impressive breadth of factual knowl-
edge about the Leninist tradition and traditional Chinese
thought has characterized these efforts to gauge Mao’s position
within the Marxist tradition and trace the many influences upon
him from without it. Yet, surprisingly, analysis of the writings
of Marx himself has played only a minor, vestigial role in these
studies. Schram and d’Encausse’s Marxism and Asia, for
example, devotes only ten pages of analysis to Marx’s own
writings, based almost wholly on isolated quotes extracted from
letters and articles on colonialism. Even Wakeman’s formidable
History and Will, which contains the most comprehensive treat-
ment of Marx’s theoretical writings in this literature, deals
with them in just over twenty widely scattered passages, largely
comprised of passing references and assertions about what Marx
was supposed to have said. Nowhere in these two works or in any
of the other cited literature is Marx himself given the attention
devoted to Lenin, Trotsky, or even Friedrich Paulsen or Kang
You-wei.
This relative paucity of at least observable research into
Marx’s own writings has in no way prevented these writers from
assessing Mao’s relationship to Marx and the Marxist tradi-
tion. A dominant theme presents Leninism as a degeneration
from original Marxism, and Maoism, in turn, as a further
degeneration from Leninism (Pfeffer, 1976). A related, recur-
rent theme presents Mao as a &dquo;voluntarist&dquo; compared with an
allegedly more &dquo;economic determinist&dquo; Marx. Mao, we are
repeatedly told, displays &dquo;activistic and voluntaristic im-
pulses&dquo; (Meisner, 1967: 266), a &dquo;Rousseauan-Jacobin volun-
tarism diffused through Marxism-Leninism&dquo; (Goldman, 1973:
246), and &dquo;extreme voluntarism&dquo; (Schram, 1969: 135). Not sur-
prisingly, the Great Leap Forward is described as &dquo;when Mao
and his comrades indulged in the greatest orgy of voluntarist
thinking in the history of the communist movement&dquo; (Schram,
1967: 160). This type of &dquo;voluntarism&dquo; has at times been sug-
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gested to be so extreme that it represents a break with &dquo;the very
essence of Marxism&dquo; and is characteristic of &dquo;a revolution which





&dquo;Voluntarism&dquo;-in this case denoting a social analysis and
revolutionary strategy stressing human will as the primary
causative agent in producing desired social change-is thus a
commonly accepted characterization of Mao’s thought.’ In the
China field the term &dquo;voluntarism&dquo; is used in two distinct but
integrally related senses. The first refers to the relative emphasis
Mao places on subjective human effort in activist politics over
objective economic forces to produce social change. In this sense
Mao is said to have inverted Marx’s dialectic, so that in his
method of analysis &dquo;superstructure&dquo; rather than &dquo;economic base&dquo;
is the primary, if not sole, factor. Closely related to this first sense
is the second-Mao’s conception of stages of revolution and the
emphasis he places on activist politics to speed, even &dquo;telescope&dquo;
the succession of these stages in Chinese society. In this second
sense Mao’s approach is contrasted with a Marx who allegedly
laid out a conception of clearly demarcated and &dquo;objectively
determined&dquo; stages of world history with specific roles pre-
scribed to each social class in every specific stage. Mao’s volun-
tarism in this second sense-that of the speeding of stages through
emphasis on politics-is viewed by Schram as closely linked to
Mao’s voluntarism in the first sense-that of emphasis on the
superstructural and human in his method of analyzing and
changing society: .
the primacy of poiitics and the human factor ... are linked and
constitute two aspects of the voluntarism that Mao Tse-tung
[Mao Ze-dong] inherited from Lenin and has carried one step
further, in a context in which reliance on the economic determin-
ism of orthodox Marxism for the accomplishment of the hoped-
for revolution was even less possible than in the Russia of 1917.
[Schram, 1969: 266]
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So Mao, faced with a situation in which the &dquo;economic determin-
ism of orthodox Marxism&dquo; was of no use, went even further than
Lenin in speeding the stages of history despite the lack of eco-
nomic development that Marx allegedly saw as a necessary pre-
condition for socialist revolution. Mao, after dispensing almost
totally with Marx’s &dquo;economic determinism,&dquo; we are told,
developed a voluntaristic method of analysis and strategy for
social change that placed near-total emphasis on human will
as the primary causative agent, making the superstructure rather
than the economic base the key category of analysis.
Meisner, who with Schram has been one of Mao’s foremost
interpreters in the China field, agrees with this twofold concep-
tion of Mao’s voluntarism. For Meisner, what he refers to as the
&dquo;socialist faith&dquo; of both Mao and his teacher Li Da-zhao
was ultimately based not upon confidence in the workings of the
objective laws of socialist development, but rather upon con-
fidence in their abilities to bring forth powerful subjective forces
latent in the present-the great storehouses of &dquo;surplus energy&dquo;
that Li argued had been accumulating in China over the centuries.
The ideas, wills, and the &dquo;self consciousness&dquo; of man would really
determine the course of Chinese history. [Meisner, 1967: 266]
After noting this, the first sense of Mao’s voluntarism, Meisner
links it with the second:
These notions reflected not only the voluntarist’s impatience
with the economic forces of history and his impulse to carry out
the proletarian revolution, even without the actual proletariat if
need be, but also the willingness of the Chinese nationalist to
abandon the only progressive social class in Chinese society ...
and to look to broader, &dquo;national&dquo; sources of revolution. [Meis-
ner, 1967: 267]2
With Mao’s apparent voluntarism enjoying such a solid con-
sensus, the only task left is to retrace its intellectual origins.
Wakeman’s cerebral History and Will seeks to do precisely this.
Wakeman traces the early influences on Mao-Wang Yang-
ming’s concept of praxis as developing the world to develop the
[105] 
self; neo-Kantianism’s concept of reason creating social forms
that liberate the self from customs; Darwin’s notion of objective
laws of evolutionary change; and T. H.~ Green’s glorification of
will and his depiction of society as the instrument of individual
self-realization, among many others. &dquo;Those earlier reflections,&dquo;
Wakeman (1973: 294) concludes, &dquo;allowed Mao a commitment
to continuous and unending historical change that was far more
extreme than Marx’s own.&dquo; This is, in part, the case because
Mao’s &dquo;variant of Jacobinism&dquo; has &dquo;salvationist roots&dquo;&dquo;the
Confucian gentleman’s duty to renovate the people&dquo; (Wakeman,
1973: 63).
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE FIRST ASPECT OF MAO’S &dquo;VOLUNTARISM&dquo; 
_ _
This almost universal conception of Mao as a voluntarist is
closely related to the manner in which the issue of &dquo;determinism&dquo;
versus &dquo;voluntarism&dquo; is conceived in the China field. The very
terms and categories these scholars use to think about and discuss
the dialectical modes of analysis of both Marx and Mao preclude
an accurate conception of the analytical method of either thinker.
Instead of conceiving in a dialectical fashion, as did Marx, of
superstructure and economic base as merely different aspects
or sides of a single unit or conceptual structure, these writers
without exception resort to the atomistic conceptions of our own
Western philosophical and scientific traditions. Superstructure
and economic base are instead considered, in the fashion of the
dominant positivistic social sciences, as distinct, separable
factors or independent variables reacting on one another. With
Marx’s method of analysis conceived of in this fashion, it is
virtually impossible to accurately interpret the thought of either
Marx or Mao.
Without Marx’s analytical method of a single conceptual
structure containing opposing and dialectically interrelated
aspects, the authors are forced to rely on a series of oversimpli-
fied dualities in order to talk about Marx and evaluate Mao.
Issues are cast in terms of &dquo;voluntarism versus determinism,&dquo;
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&dquo;superstructure versus base,&dquo; and &dquo;human will versus objective
economic forces,&dquo; despite the fact that Marx never conceived of
these terms as distinct, separable factors. However the issue is
characterized, these authors universally present a series of
either/ or choices as opposite ends of an imaginary spectrum. The
whole effort becomes merely one of choosing which end of the
duality each thinker is &dquo;closer&dquo; to. For Meisner the choice is
between, variously, &dquo;social superstructure&dquo; and &dquo;economic
base&dquo; (1965:168); &dquo;political factors&dquo; or &dquo;economic factors&dquo; (1965:
168); &dquo;ideas&dquo; or &dquo;material forces&dquo; (1965: 168); &dquo;the choices and
actions of men&dquo; or &dquo;the inexorable movement of material forces&dquo;
(1971: 6); and the &dquo;ethically desirable and humanly possible&dquo;
and the &dquo;historically predetermined&dquo; (1971: 7). Schram’s formu-
lation of the same problem differs only verbally. For him the
issue is a choice between &dquo;human will&dquo; and &dquo;objective reality&dquo;
(Schram and ~d’Encausse, 1969: 108); and &dquo;voluntarism&dquo; and
&dquo;an utterly deterministic force majeure&dquo; (Schram, 1967: 160).
Even when scholars have taken rare exception to the character-
ization of Maoism as voluntarism, they have remained entrapped
within this dualistic conception. For this reason, Holubnychy
(1964; 1965) can only assert the exact opposite from Schram and
Meisner-that Mao is, like Marx, &dquo;utterly deterministic,&dquo; rather
than a voluntarist like Stalin. For him the choice is between
&dquo;man’s will&dquo; and &dquo;objective laws.&dquo;
With the issue thus formulated as a choice between clearly
opposite and separate poles, there could be no middle ground
between the Schram/ Meisner and the Holubnychy positions-
it was necessary to emphasize one end of the voluntarism/ deter-
minism duality or the other. This choice, based on a miscon-
ceived distinction between superstructure and economic base, is
at the root of the failure of Holubnychy and Schram to develop
a scholarly dialogue-there was no basis for communication. To
Schram, who focused on Mao’s distinctive mass campaigns, Mao
was obviously an &dquo;extreme voluntarist&dquo;; to Holubnychy, who
focused upon Mao’s concept of practice, Mao was &dquo;utterly
deterministic,&dquo; since he asserts, as did Marx, that human con-
sciousness is firmly rooted in the material process of production.
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Within this dualistic, either/ or framework there was simply no
way to incorporate the insights of each writer into a coherent,
complete portrait of Mao. Schram, as a result, could do little
more than curtly declare Holubnychy’s conception &dquo;ironic&dquo; in
the light of the obvious extreme voluntarism of the Great Leap
Forward (Schram, 1967: 159-160), while Holubnychy, on the
other hand, could only vent his wrath on Schram and the China
field for being &dquo;purely&dquo; ideological (Holubnychy, 1965: 190).
None of these writers, apparently, could conceive of Mao as
being neither a &dquo;determinist&dquo; nor a &dquo;voluntarist.&dquo; There is simply
no way, in their conception, to reconcile seemingly voluntaristic
and deterministic aspects of Mao’s thought.
’ 
Interpreters of Mao, since they conceived of the issues in these
dualistic, either/ or terms, with superstructure and base as clearly
separate factors, found themselves in a difficult position when
trying to explain Marx’s obvious acknowledgment of &dquo;human
activity&dquo; as an important aspect of the development of history.
As virtually all of Mao’s interpreters recognize, Marx in no way
precluded ideas, laws, and other aspects of the superstructure
from playing an important role in human history. A complex
problem thus presented itself-if Marx designated an active role
to the superstructure, how could his approach possibly be dis-
tinguished from Mao’s? The solution to this problem was the
only one that could be afforded by a conception of superstruc-
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ture and base as separate factors-an exceedingly vague, con-
tradictory, and formless relativism.
Marx, instead of being presented as a thinker with a complex,
coherent conception of the relationship between superstructure
and base, is portrayed as a thinker with unspecified, contra-
dictory &dquo;strains&dquo; in his thought &dquo;voluntaristic elements&dquo; and
&dquo;deterministic elements&dquo; (Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 110).
This presentation of Marx is made plausible by pulling ambigu-
ous, isolated quotes from widely different sources and, not
surprisingly, declaring them &dquo;fragmentary and inconclusive&dquo;
(Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 9-15). Since Marx’s thought
allegedly contains both &dquo;voluntaristic and deterministic ele-
ments,&dquo; we are asked to believe that Marx is an economic
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determinist, but that &dquo; ’voluntarism’ is by no means absent from
Marx himself&dquo; (Schram, 1969: 135). Marx, quite confusingly,
must be an economic determinist who is &dquo;somewhat&dquo; of a volun-
, 
tarist. Perhaps more confusing, such &dquo;orthodox&dquo; Marxists as
Kautsky were &dquo;even more&dquo; . deterministic than Marx, but still,
Marx &dquo;tended to emphasize economic and social determinism&dquo;
(Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 17). Lenin, who lacked &dquo;pa-
tience&dquo; with Marx’s &dquo;determinism,&dquo; subsequently &dquo;shifted the
accent from the determinist to the voluntarist strand in Marx’s
thought.&dquo; If this concept of &dquo;shifting the accent&dquo; seems vague,
Lenin’s position is made no clearer when Schram qualifies even
Lenin’s own &dquo;voluntarism&dquo;: &dquo;This does not mean, of course,
that he believed there were no limits to the action of the revolu-
tionaries ; he always stressed the fact that one must adapt one-
self to concrete revolutionary situations&dquo; (Schram and d’En-
causse, 1969: 17). Schram’s conception of the relationship
between Marx and Lenin boils down to this: Marx was a deter-
minist who was somewhat of a voluntarist; Lenin was a volun-
tarist who was somewhat of a determinist. The difference is
merely one of &dquo;accent.&dquo;
Since this complex problem of specifying the concrete dif-
ferences between Marxists in their respective conceptions of
superstructure/ base relations has become merely a question of
pegging each thinker into a continuum running from deter-
minism to voluntarism, dealing with Mao is no real problem. All
that is necessary is to assert, with characteristic vagueness, that
&dquo;there is no doubt&dquo; that Lenin’s voluntarism is carried &dquo;still
further in Mao Tse-tung&dquo; (Schram, 1969: 135). This greater
voluntarism is characterized by a &dquo;general shift in emphasis&dquo;
from base to superstructure, where Mao now &dquo;tends&dquo; to see
superstructure as the more important of the two (Meisner,
1965: 168-169). The Chinese may evoke the &dquo;deterministic
formulas of Marx,&dquo; but this is only a smoke screen-Mao’s
conception clearly reflects a &dquo;lack of confidence in the deter-
mining forces of history&dquo; (Meisner, 1965: 168-169). In such a
conception, where thinkers can be distinguished only by the
distance between them on the voluntarism/ determinism spec-
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trum, it helps to accentuate the differences between thinkers
to give this conception some semblance of concrete meaning.
So the complex implications of Marx’s own &dquo;voluntarism&dquo; are
simply ignored, and Marx is characterized simply as a &dquo;deter-
minist,&dquo; while Mao, largely in order to be able to distinguish him
from the voluntarist Lenin, must of necessity be labelled an
&dquo;extreme&dquo; voluntarist (Schram, 1969: 135). It is remarkable
that, aside from the relativistic jargon-Lenin &dquo;tends&dquo; to empha-
size voluntaristic &dquo;strands&dquo; and so forth-there is simply very
little discussion of the concrete substance of the differences in
each thinker’s treatment of actual superstructure/ base rela-
tionships-such as the crucial one between material conditions
and human consciousness. On such a foundation has been






The case for Mao’s voluntarism in this first sense-that of
analytical method and revolutionary strategy-suffers from two
substantial flaws. First, Mao’s interpreters rely far too readily
on vague assertions about Marx’s &dquo;determinism&dquo; rather than on
detailed, concrete analysis of the writings of Marx himself. The
result is a systematic overstatement of the &dquo;relative&dquo; importance
Marx placed on the economic base in generating social change, as
well as a complete misstatement of the actual relationship Marx
saw between this economic base and the superstructure. Second,
once these assertions about Marx pass unchallenged, these
writers proceed, in turn, to exaggerate Mao’s reliance on super-
structural and attitudinal change to transform Chinese society.
The result is a caricature of both Marx and Mao, presenting
Marx as an &dquo;economic determinist&dquo; and Mao as a &dquo;voluntarist&dquo;
rife with Hegelian and Confucian influences.
Characteristic of these previous exaggerations of Marx’s
&dquo;determinism&dquo; is the cursory treatment of Marx’s relationship
with the so-called &dquo;orthodox Marxists&dquo; of the late nineteenth
century. Schram, remember, clearly acknowledges that these
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&dquo;orthodox Marxists&dquo; were &dquo;even more&dquo; deterministic than
Marx, but he merely sweeps this problem under the rug when he
vaguely asserts that Marx still &dquo;tended to emphasize economic
and social determinism&dquo;-whatever this means (Schram and
d’Encausse, 1969: 17). This sort of obfuscation on complex issues
is at the heart of the commonplace exaggeration of Marx’s
&dquo;determinism&dquo; by interpreters of Mao.
Ample evidence exists in the writings of both Marx and Engels
to demonstrate that the differences between Marx and these
turn-of-the-century &dquo;orthodox Marxists&dquo; were indeed great.
Engels, Marx’s closest collaborator and foremost interpreter,
spent in the waning years of his life a significant amount of time
. correcting the common misinterpretations by these &dquo;orthodox
Marxists&dquo; who systematically ignored the important role Marx
attributed to all aspects of the superstructure. Engels constantly
repeated to these &dquo;Marxists,&dquo; who reduced Marx’s method of
analysis into a form of economic determinism, that. although
he and Marx had asserted, in opposition to German idealist
philosophers, that all social life was firmly rooted in material
life, this in no way meant that the &dquo;economic base&dquo; caused all
social life. Elements of the superstructure, he incessantly re-
peated, continually react on one another and on the economic
base itself. In a letter to Mehring on July 14, 1893, Engels attrib-
uted this common misperception to the fact that in such early
polemics as The German Ideology, where he and Marx were
refuting idealistic philosophical conceptions of &dquo;ideals&dquo; or of a
&dquo;world-spirit&dquo; as the sole moving force of world history, empha-
sis was of necessity laid to the important links between mental
and material life:
there is only one other point lacking, which, however Marx and
I always failed to stress enough in our writings, and in regard to
which we are all equally guilty. We all, that is to say, laid and
were bound to lay the main emphasis at first on the derivation of
political, juridical and other ideological notions, and of the
actions arising through the medium of these notions, from basic
economic facts. But in so doing we were found to neglect the
formal side-the way in which these notions came about-for
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sake of the content. This has given our adversaries ample oppor-
tunity for misunderstanding. [Marx and Engels, 1942: 510-511]
The primary misunderstanding derived from their necessary
stress on the link between the material and mental, Engels
explained, was
the fatuous notion of the ideologists that because we deny an
independent historical development to the various ideological
spheres which play a part in history we also deny them any effect
upon history. The basis of this is the common undialectical con-
ception of cause and effect as rigidly opposite poles, the total
disregarding of interaction; these gentlemen often almost deliber-
ately forget that once an historic element has been brought into
the world by other elements, ultimately by economic facts, it
also reacts in its turn and may react on its environment and even
on its own causes. [Marx and Engels, 1942: 512] .
On the contrary, Engels explained, the &dquo;common undialectical
conception&dquo; of a determinist interpretation systematically
ignores the obvious importance of superstructural elements as a
potentially independent source of social change. With reference
to politics, an element of the superstructure, Engels wrote to
Conrad Schmidt on October 27, 1890: .
the new independent power, while having in the main to follow
the movement of production, also, owing to its inward inde-
pendence ... reacts in its turn upon the conditions and course of
production. It is the interaction of two unequal forces: on the one
hand the economic movement, on the other the new political
power ... which, having once been established, is endowed with a
movement of its own. [Marx and Engels, 1942: 480]
Engels nowhere stated more unequivocally Marx’s position
about the relationship between superstructure and economic
base than in his now-famous letter to J. Bloch of September 22,
1890. Here Engels reminded Bloch that in the materialist con-
ception of history, human material life was only the &dquo;ultimately&dquo;
determining factor, in the sense that it profoundly shaped the
superstructure in distinctive ways:
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More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. If there-
fore somebody twists this into the statement that the economic
element is the only determining one, he transforms it into a
meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation
is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure-
political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, con-
stitutions established by the victorious class after a successful
battle, etc.-forms of law-and then even the reflexes of all these
actual struggles in the brains of the combatants: political, legal,
philosophical theories, religious ideas and their further develop-
ment into systems of dogma-also exercise their influence upon
the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponder-
ate in determining theirJ’orm. There is an interaction of all these
elements. [Marx and Engels, 1942: 475]
Engels not only laid out as a general, abstract proposition
that elements in the superstructure strongly influence the eco-
nomic base in producing social change, he also gave specific
examples to illustrate his points. He explained that state power,
merely one element of the superstructure, crucially shaped the
development of the economic base in three basic ways-it could
encourage production, channel it into certain directions, or,
through misguided policies, obstruct economic progress, with
disastrous effects on both state and, society (Marx and Engels,
1942: 481-482). This effect is accomplished through the use of
another aspect of the superstructure-the state’s laws and finan-
cial policies&dquo;tariffs, free trade, good or bad fiscal system&dquo;
(Marx and Engels, 1942: 481-482). The &dquo;cringing servility&dquo; of
the German petty bourgeoisie, and their deference to princes and
nobles, for example, permitted a legal situation that accounted
for the &dquo;miserable economic position&dquo; of the German princi-
palities from 1640 to 1830 (Marx and Engels, 1942: 517; 1955:
442).
Further, this reaction of superstructure on the economic base’
in no way precludes a conception of the superstructure as firmly
rooted in the economic base. Insted, the proper relation between
superstructure and base is a &dquo;dialectical unity&dquo;-a conception
of a simultaneous shaping of base by superstructure and vice-
versa-a constant, dynamic process whereby superstructure and
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base shape each other into a coherent social structure. Indeed,
as Engels had explained some 30 years earlier, the very fact that
we recognize a relation in society implies that the two related
aspects are reciprocally related: &dquo;The fact that it is a relation
already implies that it has two aspects which are related to each
other. Each of these aspects is examined separately; this reveals
the nature of their mutual behavior, their reciprocal action&dquo;
(Marx, 1971: 225-226). This complex relational conceptualiza-
tion simply cannot be comprehended by resorting to the dualis-
tic categories employed in the China field. It is not a question
of &dquo;determinism&dquo; versus &dquo;voluntarism,&dquo; still less of measuring
the &dquo;relative accent&dquo; placed on either the superstructure or the
economic base. It is absolutely vital, instead, to have a clear
conception of the actual complex relations Marx saw between
aspects of social reality. Without this conception we are reduced
to a vague relativism that can only produce caricatures of the
. thinkers under consideration-precisely the approach so often
used in previous efforts on Mao and Marx.
Engels provided clear examples of this elusive superstructure/
base relationship. Law, for example, a profession that grows out
of the division of labor of society, is charged also with regulating
that division of labor (Marx and Engels, 1955: 399-400). Indeed,
it is impossible to maintain any division of labor in society with-
out a system of laws with which to regulate it. A capitalist eco-
nomic base generates a specific system of law-necessarily en-
shrining private property-which naturally, in turn, reacts on
the economic base. Engels points out the sections in Capital on
the working-day, where parliamentary legislation had a deter-
mining effect on the length of the working-day-which for Marx
was an important determinant of surplus-value-as just such an
example of this complex relationship between superstructure and
base (Marx and Engels, 1955: 402). In the same manner, colonial
wars, as the most violent form of political activity rooted in
the economic life of capitalism, in turn have a strong effect on
that economic base, as in &dquo;the case of the conquest and brutal
destruction of economic resources&dquo; (Marx and Engels, 1955:
399). Engels quite clearly felt that &dquo;Political, juridical, philo-
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sophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based
on economic development.&dquo; But this conception in no way
precludes their reaction upon the economic base. On the con-
trary :
all these react upon one another and also upon the economic
base ... it is not, as people try here and there conveniently to
imagine, that the economic position produces an automatic effect.
Men make their history themselves, only in given surroundings
which condition it and on the basis of actual relations already
existing. [Marx and Engels, 1942: 517]
These assertions about the effect of elements of the super-
structure in the course of history were not merely qualifications
adopted by the elderly Engels to defend the contradictions within
the besieged system of his late collaborator. Marx himself con-
sistently asserted, both as a general proposition,’and in specific
examples, the effects of superstructural elements on the eco-
nomic base. These assertions were not contradictory &dquo;volun-
taristic strands&dquo; in Marx’s thought but were integral parts of his
dialectical method of analysis. When speaking of production,
distribution, exchange, and consumption, for example, Marx
declared that: &dquo;Mutual interaction takes place between the
different moments. This [is] the case with every organic whole&dquo;
(Marx, 1973: 100). This model of reciprocal interaction allows,
indeed requires, the superstructure to influence the economic
base-for the &dquo;mental&dquo; to affect the &dquo;material.&dquo; So under certain
circumstances, for Marx, &dquo;theory, too, becomes a material force
once it seizes the masses&dquo; (Marx, 1970: 137).3 Reflecting this
appreciation, when Marx set out to write about concrete histori-
cal events he attributed great importance to the role of politics,
law, and even great leaders in contributing to social change. His
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and Class Struggles in
France, 1848-1850-which were, in Engels’ words, &dquo;Marx’s first
attempt, with the aid of his materialist conception, to explain
a section of contemporary history from the given economic
situation&dquo; (Marx, 1964: 9)-are replete with accounts of decisive
political actions taken by governments, parties, and even indi-
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viduals, relatively independent of any immediate economic con-
nection, in making history (Marx, 1964; Marx and Engels, 1968:
95-180).
Further, this role attributed to superstructure is not only evi-
dent in Marx’s political writings, it is also consistently reiter-
ated in the most theoretical of Marx’s &dquo;economic&dquo; works-
Capital. In Marx’s treatment of the development of capitalism
in Great Britain, for example, superstructural elements-the
state and its laws and financial regulations-play decisive roles
in the development or nondevelopment of productive forces.
This is the very same development of productive forces, accord-
ing to the interpretation of Marx as a determinist, that is sup-
posed to be an inexorable, &dquo;objective&dquo; event, independent of
&dquo;human will&dquo; (Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 108). On the con-
trary, a crucial factor in the development of capitalism is the
ability of a political entity to develop an effective system of
national credit. The development of a system of national debt
and the printing of banknotes as legal tender for commodities,
for example, stimulated industrial growth both in the home
country and in other nations toward which credit was extended
(Marx, 1967: 754-756). This superstructural system of financial
laws, Marx felt, was one important reason why capitalism devel-
oped where and when it did. Such a system accounted for the
early mercantile prominence of Venice; Venetian credit, when
extended to the Netherlands, stimulated its early capitalist
growth; the Dutch system of credit, once developed, in turn
stimulated Great Britain’s capitalist industrialization. At the
time he was writing Capital, Marx related, this process of stimu-
lation through the system of credit and national debt was under-
way between Great Britain and the United States (Marx, 1967:
754-756). But not only did this superstructural system of finan-
cial laws have an influence on when and where capitalism devel-
oped, it also affected the pace of industrial growth. Marx felt
that Great Britain’s laws of protection and tariffs, coupled with
the development of systems of national debt and taxation,
was an artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers, of
expropriating independent labourers, of capitalizing the national
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means of production and subsistence, of forcibly abbreviating
the transition from the medieval to the modern mode of produc-
tion. [Marx, 1967: 756-757]
But if Marx was clearly not the determinist he has so often
been portrayed to be, nevertheless it would be misleading to end
the discussion of Marx’s conception of superstructure and base
here, after asserting, on the basis of a few passages, that Marx
gave an important role to superstructural elements in producing
social change. As the treatment of Marx in the China field
illustrates, quotes can be readily found to support almost any
position about what Marx was supposed to have said. It is vital,
instead, to weave these passages into an alternative interpreta-
tion of Marx’s method of analysis, specifying how he used his
definitions and concepts in his dialectical method of analysis.
Before we can even speak of the relative roles Marx attributed to
economic base and superstructure in. generating social change,
it, is necessary to understand how Marx used the concepts &dquo;super-




1. The characterization of Mao as a voluntarist has not always been the subject of
such broad consensus in the China field. Holubnychy’s (1964) complex analysis of Mao’s
thought stressed that Mao’s conception of dialectical materialism emphasizes the links
between human consciousness and the material process of production-far more so than
did Stalin, whom Holubnychy contrasts with Mao as an example of a voluntarist. The
following year, in a review of three of Schram’s early works (Holubnychy, 1965: 187-188),
he objected strenuously to the labeling of Mao as an "extreme voluntarist." Schram’s
(1967: 159-160) cavalier dismissal of Holubnychy’s objections marked the end of this
brief exchange, which never really developed into an intellectual debate, and attests to
the seriousness with which alternative interpretations have ever been considered in the
China field.
2. This position contradicts Meisner’s earlier, correct realization that there is no
rigid conception of stages of world history in Marx against which to measure Mao’s
voluntarism (Meisner, 1965: 166). To assert, as Meisner does here, that Mao is a volun-
tarist because he sought to make revolution without the proletariat implies that Meisner
accepts the view that there is a proper stage for socialist revolution and a proper social
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class to carry it out within this stage. Meisner apparently either has abandoned Marx
as the baseline for measuring voluntarism or has ignored or revised his earlier interpreta-
tion of Marx’s materialist conception of history.
3. Meisner (1965: 169), in a passage indicative of the common misunderstanding of
Marx’s method, cites a paraphrase of this quote from Marx in a Chinese journal as prima
facie evidence that Maoists have completely abandoned Marx’s "determinism."
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